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WISCONSIN'S NEW ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION
STATUTE: FIRST THE PUNISHMENT,
THEN THE TRIAL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Driving while under the influence of an intoxicant is deplorable, antiso-
cial, dangerous behavior which the legislature can - and should - penal-
ize severely.1 "The legislature has [acted]... in a continuing effort to keep
drivers who are under the influence of intoxicants off the highway. It re-
flects the public's attitude and belief that such drivers are a sinister hazard
"2
The national and local press have provided much information on the
indignant public reaction to people who are driving under the influence3 on
our nation's highways.4 Groups such as Mothers Against Drunk Drivers
have become national in scope.5 Consequently, most states, including Wis-
consin, have revised their laws dealing with the impaired driver.6
According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, "[iun
excess of fifty percent of all drivers killed each year have blood alcohol
concentrations higher than the legally recognized limit, 0.1%. '7 An aver-
age 25,000 Americans per year lose their lives in alcohol-related traffic acci-
* On December 6, 1988, Federal Judge Joseph P. Stadtmueller issued a preliminary
injunction against enforcement of Wisconsin's administrative suspension statute holding the law
unconstitutional. Judge Stadtmueller's decision was based on the lack of a meaningful pre-
suspension hearing and post-suspension hearing. On December 13, 1988, Wisconsin Governor
Tommy G. Thompson announced that the State Department of Transportation will issue an
emergency rule to continue enforcement of the law. The emergency rule will be effective for 150
days.
1. State v. Caibaiosai, 122 Wis. 2d 587, 601, 363 N.W.2d 574, 581 (1985) (Abrahamson, J.,
dissenting).
2. Id. at 601, 363 N.W.2d at 581 (Majority Opinion).
3. Driving while "under the influence" indicates driving with a blood alcohol concentration
(BAC) equal to or exceeding statutory limits. The statutory limit in Wisconsin is 0.1% or more
of alcohol in a person's blood or 0.1 gram or more of alcohol in 210 liters of a person's breath.
Wis. ADMIN. CODE § 113.02(1) [Trans] 190-1 (Dec. 1987). The purpose of this section is to
establish the Department of Transportation's administrative interpretation of Wis. STAT.
§ 343.305(8) (1985-86).
4. Watts, The Drinking-Driving Problem: Assessing Some Proposed Solutions, 48 POPULAR
GOV'T 20 (1983).
5. Id. MADD is an acronym for Mothers Against Drunk Drivers. Id.
6. The term "impaired driver" is used to connote driving while under the influence. T. HAM-
MER, R. KALAL, R. KINDSCHI & J. MCNALLY, TRAFFIC LAW AND PRACTICE IN WISCONSIN
(1987) [hereinafter T. Hammer].
7. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. DIGEST OF
STATE ALCOHOL-HIGHWAY SAFETY RELATED LEGISLATION (1983).
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dents and more than 650,000 are injured. The need for the United States
Congress as well as the state legislatures to respond to this problem is clear.
The legislatures have reacted by enacting an array of laws that punish im-
paired drivers9 and deter others from drinking and driving.10
Recently, Wisconsin responded by enacting a statute for the administra-
tive suspension of a driver's license.II The statute applies to drivers accused
of refusing to take the chemical test under the implied consent law, 12 or to
drivers who submit to the test and have a blood alcohol concentration of
0.1% or more."' This new statute places in issue whether the driver's con-
stitutional right to procedural due process is violated by the administrative
suspension of the driver's license. 4 Since the driver has no meaningful op-
portunity to be heard, the driver is deprived of property without due
process.
This Comment begins by developing a historical perspective for the en-
actment of the administrative suspension statute. 5 It then discusses the
purpose and specific provisions of the administrative suspension statute.'6
In addition, the constitutionality of the statute is examined. This Comment
concludes by urging that the administrative suspension of a driver's license
is an infringement on the individual's constitutional right to due process,
and suggests some alternative solutions to the current statute.
8. Id. Also, some estimates place the annual economic loss from these accidents at $24 bil-
lion for actual damages alone. Id.
9. The acronym OMVWI refers to operating under the influence of an intoxicant or drug.
The cases and other literature also include designations such as DUI, DWI, OAI, OAWI, and
OWL See T. HAMMER, supra note 6, at 5-10 n.14.
10. Adelman, Introduction, 69 MARQ. L. REv. 159 (1986).
11. Wis. STAT. § 343.305 (1985-86), affected by 1987 Wis. Act 3. The title of this statute is:
"Tests for Intoxication; Administrative Suspension and Court-Ordered Revocation" (effective
Jan. 1, 1988).
12. Wis. STAT. § 343.305(2) (1985-86).
13. Wis. STAT. § 343.305(7) (1985-86).
14. "No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
." U.S. CONST. amend. V; "[n]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
15. See infra notes 17-26 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 27-50 and accompanying text.
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II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. A History of Wisconsin's Impaired Driver Statutes Including the
Implied Consent Laws
In 1911, the state legislature enacted Wisconsin's first statute addressing
the impaired driver. 7 The relevant laws have been consistently altered
since 1911. In 1981, there was a significant alteration of the existing im-
paired driver statute, 8 and in 1985, there was another modification of the
statute.19 The current revisions of the statute have been effective since Jan-
uary 1, 1988.20
The 1981 revision of the impaired driving laws was prompted by several
legislative purposes which have been a pervasive theme in the subsequent
revisions as well.21 The purposes include: providing maximum safety for all
users of the highways of this state; deterring the operation of a motor vehi-
cle by persons who have a blood alcohol concentration of 0.1% or more;
and denying the operation of a motor vehicle to such persons.22 In the
legislature's attempt to effectuate these purposes, particularly the need to
enhance the statute's deterrent value, each revision has resulted in a stricter
statute. Additionally, this purpose was most significant in the enactment of
Wisconsin's administrative suspension statute.
The implied consent law applies to all persons who operate motor vehi-
cles on Wisconsin highways, and are deemed by that activity to have im-
plicitly consented to chemical testing under the statute:2 3
Any person who drives or operates a motor vehicle upon the public
highways of this state ... shall be deemed to have given consent to
one or more tests of his or her breath, blood or urine, for the purpose
of determining the presence... of alcohol... when requested to do
17. "[N]o intoxicated person shall operate, ride or drive any automobile, motor cycle or other
similar motor vehicle along or upon any public highway of this state." Wis. STAT. § 1636-49
(1911).
18. 1981 Wis. Laws 20, amended by 1981 Wis. Laws 184.
19. 1985 Wis. Act 337.
20. 1987 Wis. Act 3. The provisions of 1987 Wis. Act 3 have effective dates of March 1, 1987
and January 1, 1988. 1987 Wis. Laws 30. The focus of this Comment is on the administrative
suspension provisions effective January 1, 1988.
21. 1981 Wis. Laws 20, § 2051(13), amended by 1981 Wis. Laws 184, § 10.
22. Id. Other purposes include encouraging vigorous prosecution of those who operated
motor vehicles with a BAC of 0.1% or more, and promoting driver improvement. Id.
23. See T. HAMMER, supra note 6, at 5-8. This law applies to all persons who drive on
Wisconsin highways; it is not limited to Wisconsin residents or those with a Wisconsin license. Id.
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so by a law enforcement officer under [the provisions of the implied
consent statute]. 24
The underlying purpose of the implied consent law is to obtain the
blood alcohol concentration of the impaired driver for evidence to prose-
cute the driver.2" In an effort to gather this evidence, the consent referred
to is not optional, "but is an implied condition precedent to the operation of
a motor vehicle on Wisconsin public highways."26
B. The Enactment of Wisconsin's Administrative Suspension Statute
1. The Purpose of Wisconsin's Administrative Suspension Statute
The administrative suspension statute represents the legislature's at-
tempt to rectify the problems associated with the former impaired driving
legislation. Most importantly, the statute is intended to strengthen the
state's methods of dealing with the problem of drinking and driving.27 The
previous legislation included a system ofjudicial revocation for driving with
a blood alcohol concentration of 0.1% or more which was replaced by a
system of administrative action against the driver's license.2 In an attempt
to restore the incentives for submitting to testing, the penalties for an un-
lawful refusal were increased in relation to the penalties for the impaired
driving offenses.29
The administrative suspension statute was enacted to correct the defi-
ciencies of the former statute3" and refine the law's effectiveness and deter-
24. Wis. STAT. § 343.305(1) (1985-86), affected by 1987 Wis. Act 3. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court has indicated that subsection (1) of this implied consent statute declares the legislative
policy that those who drive, consent to chemical testing. State v. Nordness, 128 Wis. 2d 15, 28,
381 N.W.2d 300, 305 (1986). The remainder of the statute consists of the procedures to be used
for the implementation of this policy. Id. Wisconsin's first implied consent statute was 1969 Wis.
Laws 383 § 4 (1969).
25. Nordness, 128 Wis. 2d at 33, 381 N.W.2d at 307; see Note, Implied Consent Laws: Some
Unsettled Constitutional Questions, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 99 (1980) (citing to implied consent laws of
all fifty states).
26. County of Milwaukee v. Proegler, 95 Wis. 2d 614, 623, 291 N.W.2d 608, 612 (1980); see
also 4 R. ERWIN, DEFENSE OF DRUNK DRIVING CASES § 33.01 (3d ed. 1985) (discussion of
theories of national implied consent legislation).
27. See T. HAMMER, supra note 6, at 4-9; see also Hancock & Maassen, Wisconsin's New
Drinking Age and Drunk Driving Law, 59 WIs. BAR BULL. 9 (Sept. 1986).
28. See 1987 Wis. Act 3.
29. Id. Before January 1, 1987, a first implied consent refusal required court-ordered suspen-
sion for six months. WIS. STAT. § 343.305(9) (1983-84). As of March 1, 1987, a first chemical test
refusal in a five-year period requires a one-year revocation of the driver's operating privileges.
Wis. STAT. § 343.305(9)(b)(2) (1987).
30. See 1985 Wis. Act 337.
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rent value.3a In terms of the implied consent law, the legislation, as noted
below, created an incentive to comply with the law and take the chemical
test even if taking the test resulted in a conviction.32 Although the adminis-
trative suspension statute substantially revised the state's impaired driving
law, the legislature did not alter the overall purpose of the impaired driving
law. 3
3
2. The Provisions of the Administrative Suspension Statute and Their
Impact on Wisconsin Law
The Wisconsin administrative suspension statute repealed the pretrial
revocation for high chemical test results as of March 1, 1987. This judicial
revocation was based on drivers having a blood alcohol concentration level
of 0.2% or higher.34 The pretrial revocation provision was repealed for
judicial efficiency since it would have added 10,000 new circuit court cases a
year to the criminal justice system.35
If a person is arrested for drunken driving, he or she is required to take
a blood, breath, or urine test under the implied consent provisions of Wis-
consin law.36 Since January 1, 1988, if the driver submits to the test and the
driver's blood alcohol concentration is 0.1% or higher, the officer will seize
the driver's license and issue a notice of suspension.37 The notice of suspen-
sion serves as a temporary driver's license and is valid for thirty days.3 8
Thereafter, the driver has ten working days to request a review of the
suspension by the Department of Transportation. 39  If no review is re-
quested, the suspension will take effect thirty days after the arrest and will
31. 1987 Wis. Act 3; see also WISCONSIN DEP'T OF TRANSP., ANALYSIS OF 1987 WISCONSIN
ACT 3 (1987) [hereinafter AT 3 ANALYSIS]. One of the most serious problems associated with
Act 337 was the incentive it created for people arrested for drunken driving to refuse the chemical
test because only the penalties for drunken driving were increased. The refusal penalties were not
increased. AcT 3 ANALYSIS, at 1.
32. See AcT 3 ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 2. Compare the penalties for a driver's first
chemical test refusal (one to two year revocation) with those for a driver's first operation under
the influence (six to nine month suspension). Id. at 12.
33. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
34. See AT 3 ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 3.
35. Id. Since March 1, 1987, the criminal offense of aggravated drunken driving is elimi-
nated. Under Act 337, this offense was committed by a person who operated a motor vehicle with
a BAC of 0.2% or higher. Id.
36. WIs. STAT. § 343.305(2) (1985-86), affected by 1987 Wis. Act 3 sec. 29.
37. WIs. STAT. § 343.305(7) (1985-86), affected by 1987 Wis. Act 3 sec. 29.
38. WIs. STAT. § 343.305(8)(a) (1985-86), affected by 1987 Wis. Act 3 sec. 29.
39. Wis. STAT. § 343.305(8)(b)1 (1985-86), affected by 1987 Wis. Act 3 sec. 29. In some
counties, the request for a review is to the office of the commissioner of transportation. Id. The
person may request a review using a form that will be provided at the time of the arrest. Id.
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remain in effect for six months. The driver will be immediately eligible to
apply for an occupational license.'
If a hearing is requested, it will be held in the county where the offense
occurred or at the nearest Department of Transportation facility. The is-
sues at the administrative hearing are limited to the following:
1. The correct identity of the person;
2. Whether the person was informed of the options regarding the
tests;
3. Whether the person had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.1%
or more at the time the offense allegedly occurred;
4. Whether one or more tests were administered in accordance
with the law;
5. Whether, if one or more tests were administered in accordance
with the law, each of the test results indicate the person had a
blood alcohol concentration of 0.1% or more;
6. Whether probable cause existed for the arrest.4 1
At the hearing, a driver may present evidence and may be represented by
counsel. The driver may submit written arguments limited to the above
issues as long as the arguments are in lieu of the driver's personal appear-
ance.42 "The arresting officer need not appear, but the hearing officer must
[possess] a copy of the officer's report and the results of the chemical
tests."
43
Since January 1, 1988, a breath test under the statute consists of the
analysis of two separate breath samples. A failure to provide two adequate
samples constitutes a refusal. 44 The current statute provides for two breath
samples in order to improve the validity and reliability of the breath test as
a measure of blood alcohol concentration.45
When a hearing is requested, it must be held within thirty days of the
arrest. If a driver is dissatisfied with the results of the review, he or she may
request a court review by a judge or a full-time court commissioner. How-
40. Wis. STAT. § 343.305(8)(d) (1985-86), affected by 1987 Wis. Act 3 sec. 29. The fee for
reinstating a license after a suspension or revocation has been increased to $50.00. Wis. Act 3 sec.
15. Also, the penalty for a second impaired driving offense is a twelve to eighteen month revoca-
tion; the penalty for a third impaired driving offense is a twenty-four to thirty-six month revoca-
tion. Wis. STAT. § 343.305(10)(b)4 (1985-86).
41. Wis. STAT. § 343.305(8)(b)2 (1985-86), affected by 1987 Wis. Act 3 see. 29.
42. Wis. ADMIN. CODE § 113 [Trans] 190 (Dec. 1987).
43. Wis. STAT. § 343.305(8)(b)l (1985-86), affected by 1987 Wis. Act 3 sec. 29.
44. Wis. STAT. § 343.305(6)(c) (1985-86), affected by 1987 Wis. Act 3 sec. 29. The intox-
ilyzer 5000 is used in Wisconsin to perform the breath test. See Acr 3 ANALYSIS, supra note 31,
at 7.
45. Wis. Admin. Reg. No. 384, at 32 (Dec. 31, 1987).
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ever, a request for a court review will not stay the suspension.46 If a driver
is found not guilty of the drunken driving charge, the suspension will be
vacated and the driver's record will be purged of the suspension.
A notice of revocation will be issued for any driver who refuses to sub-
mit to the chemical test.a" Once the officer seizes the driver's license, a
receipt is issued which serves as a thirty day temporary license. If the
driver requests a hearing within ten days of the revocation, the circuit court
will have jurisdiction over the hearing.49 If no review is requested, the revo-
cation will take effect thirty days after the arrest and will remain in effect
for one year. After a thirty day waiting period, the driver will be eligible to
apply for an occupational license.5 °
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WISCONSIN'S ADMINISTRATIVE
SUSPENSION STATUTE
Since possession of a driver's license is a property interest protected by
the notice and hearing guarantees of due process,51 Wisconsin Statute sec-
tion 343.305 must comply with these due process requirements. The due
process analysis for administrative license suspension requires an examina-
tion of two issues, both of which are next addressed by this Comment. The
first issue which must be examined is whether the interest in question is
protected under the Constitution. Secondly, it is necessary to analyze what
procedural protections must be accorded to an individual possessing the
interest against an erroneous deprivation.52 If such an interest is constitu-
tionally protected, procedural safeguards must exist.
46. Wis. STAT. § 343.305(8)(c)4 (1985-86), affected by 1987 Wis. Act 3 sec. 29. The review
may be conducted with the trial or sentencing for the underlying offense or a petition for prompt
review may be filed to expedite the process. Wis. STAT. § 343.305(8)(c)(1) (1985-86), affected by
1987 Wis. Act 3 sec. 29.
47. Wis. STAT. § 343.23 (1985-86), affected by 1987 Wis. Act 3 sec. 16(g).
48. WIs. STAT. § 343.305(9)(a) (1985-86), affected by 1987 Wis. Act 3 sec. 29.
49. Wis. STAT. § 343.305(9)(b), (c) (1985-86), affected by 1987 Wis. Act 3 sec. 29. The scope
of the hearing will be limited to the issues in paragraph 9(a)5. Wis. STAT. § 343.305(9)(c) (1985-
86), affected by 1987 Wis. Act 3 sec. 29.
50. Wis. STAT. § 343.305(10)(b) (1985-86), affected by 1987 Wis. Act 3 sec. 29. The penalty
for a second chemical test refusal is a two-year revocation, and the penalty for a third or more
chemical test refusal is a three-year revocation (within a five year period). Id.
51. Milroy, North Carolina's License Revocation for Drunk Drivers: Minor Inconvenience or
Unconstitutional Deprivation?, 62 N.C.L. REv. 1149 (1984). The fourteenth amendment guaran-
tees an individual the due process protections of notice and hearing before being deprived of an
important property interest. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
52. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
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A leading United States Supreme Court case in this area, Mackey v.
Montrym,53 utilizes a "balancing of competing interests" test to determine
when the revocation of a driver's license without a prior hearing is constitu-
tional.54 However, in Bell v. Burson,5" the Court held that unless an emer-
gency exists, a pre-suspension hearing must always be held before
deprivation of an important property interest.5 6
A. A Driver's License Is an Interest to Be Protected
The entitlement to due process protection has been historically gov-
erned by the distinction between a right and a privilege. 7 A privilege is not
a constitutional right to be protected.58 "[Tlhe Warren Court, in the late
1950's and 1960's, moved away from a focus on the actions of government
to ... the nature of the interest asserted by the individual. 59 Conse-
quently, the Warren Court repudiated the right-privilege dichotomy, which
laid the foundation for the Court's recognition of the property interest
involved.'
In Bell v. Burson,6 1 the Supreme Court recognized that a driver's li-
cense, once granted, is property within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment and cannot be taken away in violation of the relevant require-
ments of procedural due process. 62 The Bell Court stated that the method
of attaining possession is irrelevant to the protection guaranteed:
6 3
Once licenses are issued... their continued possession may become
essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses
thus involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the
licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away with-
out that procedural Due Process required by the Fourteenth
53. 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
54. Id. at 5.
55. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
56. Id. at 537.
57. Case Comment, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill: Procedural Due Process Protection
for Public Employees, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1115 (1986).
58. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
59. See Case Comment, supra note 57, at 1117.
60. Id. After the Court's repudiation of the right-privilege dichotomy, the Court dealt with
the issue of which due process protections a state must comply with before it may constitutionally
infringe on the liberty and property interests of individuals. Id. See Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971) for a discussion by Justice Blackmun of the end of the right-privilege dichotomy;
see also Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81
HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
61. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
62. See Reese & Borgel, Summary Suspension of Drunken Drivers' Licenses - A Preliminary
Constitutional Inquiry, 35 ADMIN. L. Rlv. 313 (1983).
63. Bell, 402 U.S. at 539.
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Amendment. This is but an application of the general proposition
that relevant constitutional restraints limit state power to terminate
an entitlement whether the entitlement is denominated a "right" or
a "privilege."'
In Board of Regents v. Roth,65 the United States Supreme Court recog-
nized a property interest in continued public employment.66 Justice Stew-
art noted that:
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such
as state law - rules or understandings that secure certain benefits
and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.67 To have a
property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than
an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilat-
eral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient institution of prop-
erty to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily
lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a pur-
pose of the constitutional right to a hearing to provide an opportu-
nity for a person to vindicate those claims.68
Thus, the Bell Court determined that a driver's license is an entitlement,69
which is a protected property interest in a governmental grant of permission
or monetary support.7 °
In Mackey v. Montrym,71 the Court found that the "suspension of a
driver's license for statutorily defined cause implicates a protectible prop-
64. Id. (citation omitted); see also Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 110 n.7 (1977). The Court's
recognition of the property interest involved was also evident in cases involving: continued public
employment (Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)); parole revocation (Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)); seizure of goods under a writ of replevin (Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972)); and termination of welfare benefits (Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)).
65. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
66. Id. at 578. This case is cited to demonstrate the Court's movement away from the right-
privilege dichotomy to a consideration of the interest involved; see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593 (1972).
67. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. at 577.
68. Id. The Court found that Roth's property interest in his job was created and controlled
by his contract of employment and by the governing Wisconsin statutes.
69. Bell, 402 U.S. at 539. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1986) (discussion of entitlements).
70. The entitlement theory dispensed with the right-privilege distinction; see Note, Auto-
matic Imposition of No- Work Conditions on Bonds in Deportation Proceedings: An Abuse of Dis-
cretion and Due Process, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 1009, 1020-21 (1984); see also L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978).
71. 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
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erty interest."72 The Mackey Court also recognized that the right to contin-
ued possession of a driver's license is a protected property interest within
the meaning of the Constitution. In an opinion letter from the Office of the
Attorney General of Wisconsin, Donald J. Hanaway stated that the driver's
license is a constitutionally protected interest, which prevents removal with-
out due process.73 Clearly then, a driver's license is a property interest to be
constitutionally protected. The remaining question is what procedural pro-
tections must be accorded to the individual against an erroneous depriva-
tion of that property interest.74
B. The Due Process Afforded to the Holder of a Driver's License
The question of constitutionality focuses on the procedural protections
that must be afforded to the driver.75 Furthermore, it must be determined
whether the procedural due process requirements of notice and hearing are
satisfied by Wisconsin's administrative suspension statute.76
1. The Bell - Fuentes Test
In Bell v. Burson, the Supreme Court determined the constitutionality of
Georgia's Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act.77 This statute allowed
the automatic suspension of the license of any uninsured motorist involved
in an accident, irrespective of fault, unless he or she posted security to cover
72. Id. at 10. For further discussion of a driver's license as a property interest, see Illinois v.
Batchelder, 463 U.S. 1112 (1983) (revocation of driver's license for refusing to take a breath-
analysis test); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977) (revocation of driver's license for repeated
traffic violations); Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136 (1963) (suspension of
driver's license for failing to post security under Financial Responsibility Act); McConville v.
Alexis, 97 Cal. App. 3d 593, 159 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1979) (revocation of driver's license for failing to
comply with implied consent statute); Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Quinlan, 47 Pa. Commw. 214,
408 A.2d 173 (1979) (suspension of driver's license for refusing to take a breathalyzer test);
Berberian v. Lussier, 87 R.I. 226, 139 A.2d 869 (1958) (suspension of driver's license for failing to
deposit security under Financial Responsibility Act); Jordan v. Roberts, 161 W. Va. 750, 246
S.E.2d 259 (1978) (suspension of driver's license for refusing to take breathalyzer test); State v.
Nordness, 128 Wis. 2d 15, 381 N.W.2d 300 (1986) (revocation of driver's license for implied
consent refusal); Best v. State, 99 Wis. 2d 495, 299 N.W.2d 604 (1980) (suspension of driver's
license for accumulation of demerit points for traffic violations under WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 343.085(c), 343.32(2)(a) (West Supp. 1988)).
73. 2-88 Op. Wis. Att'y Gen. 6 (Jan. 11, 1988); see also Nordness, 128 Wis. 2d 15, 381
N.W.2d 300 (1986) (revocation of driver's license for statutorily defined purpose is a protected
property interest which implicates due process protections).
74. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 10; Bell, 402 U.S. at 539-40.
75. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
76. See Milroy, supra note 51, at 1150-51.
77. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). The statute in question was the Georgia Motor
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, GA. CODE ANN. § 92A-601 (1958).
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the amount of damages.7s The Georgia statute provided an administrative
hearing before the suspension, but limited the issues that could be raised in
the summary proceeding.79 The Court held that the statute violated the
fourteenth amendment by failing to afford the petitioner a prior hearing on
liability."0 The Court stated that "except in emergency situations... due
process requires that when a State seeks to terminate an interest such as
that here involved, it must afford 'notice and opportunity for hearing ap-
propriate to the nature of the case' before the termination becomes
effective.""'
The Supreme Court in Bell did not answer the question of what consti-
tutes an emergency sufficient enough to dispense with the required guaran-
tees of notice and the opportunity to be heard."2 In Fuentes v. Shevin, s3
however, the Court did just that. 4 The Court established three require-
ments for a seizure of property to fall within the "emergency exception" to
the due process requirement of a prior hearing:
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to secure
an important governmental or general public interest. Second, there
has been a special need for very prompt action. Third, the State has
kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person
initiating the seizure has been a government official responsible for
determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that
it was necessary and justified in the particular instance8 5
Utilizing the Fuentes analysis, the courts have undertaken to assess the con-
stitutionality of pre-trial driver's license revocation for failure to comply
with implied consent laws."6 Applying the Fuentes test, courts have held
78. Bell, 402 U.S. at 535-37.
79. Id. at 537-38. The issue of fault could not be raised and the only allowable evidence
during the administrative hearing was, "(a) [whether] the petitioner or his vehicle [was] involved
in the accident; (b) [whether] petitioner complied with the provisions of the Law as provided; or
(c) [whether] petitioner [came] within any of the exceptions of the Law." Id.
80. Id. at 543.
81. Id. at 542 (quoting Opp Cotton Mills v. Administration, 312 U.S. 126, 152 (1941)); see
also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (determines the
standard for a "meaningful" hearing under the due process clause).
82. See Milroy, supra note 51, at 1151. Frequent emergency situations include the protection
of national security during wartime, the protection of the public against economic injury, and the
protection of the public health from unsafe food and drugs; see also Reese & Borgel, supra note
62, at 318.
83. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
84. Fuentes addressed state laws that authorized a pre-hearing seizure of property upon the
ex parte application of any individual claiming a right to that property. Id. at 69.
85. Id. at 91.
86. See Milroy, supra note 51, at 1151; see also Holland v. Parker, 354 F. Supp. 196 (D.S.D.
1973).
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that the license revocation is not related to an emergency and thus is uncon-
stitutional under Bell.8 7
In Holland v. Parker,8 8 the District Court of South Dakota applied
Fuentes to the state's implied consent law and found an important govern-
mental and public interest in keeping drunken drivers off the roads, as well
as a special need for very prompt action.8 9 Furthermore, the person who
initiated the seizure was a government official, a law enforcement officer. 90
Although the statute met the Fuentes criteria, the Holland court found
the statute unconstitutional under Bell. The court held that the summary
procedure did not fall within the emergency exception since only those driv-
ers who refused the chemical test, and not those who failed the test, had
their licenses revoked. 9 Thus, the summary revocation was not related di-
rectly to the state's need to keep drunken drivers off the road.
2. The Mackey - Mathews Test
In Mackey v. Montrym,92 the Supreme Court utilized a different analysis
in holding an implied consent statute constitutional. Under the Massachu-
setts statute in issue, a driver's license was automatically suspended for
ninety days if the driver refused to take a breath analysis test.93 The statute,
similar to the Wisconsin statute, provided for a hearing before a state offi-
cial at any time after the license was suspended, but provided no procedure
for a pre-suspension hearing.94
The Court stated that "the paramount interest the Commonwealth has
in preserving the safety of its public highways, standing alone, fully distin-
guishes this case from [Bell]." 95 The Court assumed the case fell within the
emergency exception and therefore, the requirement of a pre-suspension
hearing was negated. 96 However, the Mackey Court did not analyze the
Massachusetts statute under the three-prong Fuentes test. Rather, the
87. See Milroy, supra note 51, at 1152.
88. 354 F. Supp. 196 (D.S.D. 1973).
89. Holland, 354 F. Supp. at 202.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
93. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(f) (West Supp. 1983). This statute has subse-
quently been amended to provide for 120 days of suspension.
94. Id. at § 24(1)(g); see also Wis. STAT. § 343.305(8)(b) (1985-86), affected by 1987 Wis.
Act 3. This specific provision of the Massachusetts statute is similar to the Wisconsin statute.
The statutes differ because the Wisconsin statute applies to drivers who refuse to comply with the
implied consent law and those who do comply, but have a BAC of 0.1% or more. Id.
95. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 17. The Court based the distinction on the fact that Bell concerned
revocation for failure to post security, which was not a threat to public safety. Id.
96. Id. at 18.
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Court applied the "balancing of interests" test from Mathews v. Eldridge9 7
to ascertain whether the procedure comported with due process.98
In Mathews, the Court determined that the due process analysis requires
a balancing of three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedure used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's in-
terest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administra-
tive burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.99
The Mackey Court's application of the Mathews test to the Massachusetts
statute recognized the importance of the private interest of "continued pos-
session and use of the license pending the outcome of the hearing.' '" °"
The balancing of the private interest against the governmental interest
was weighed by three additional factors established by the Mackey Court:
the duration of the revocation; the availability of hardship relief; and the
availability of prompt post-revocation review. °10 The Court found the im-
plied consent statute was constitutional. In other words, the substantial pri-
vate interest was outweighed by the government's interest in preserving the
safety of the highways.1"2 The availability of prompt post-revocation re-
view to protect against an erroneous deprivation tipped the scale in favor of
the state's interest. 103
97. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
98. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 10. The Mathews case involved the termination of disability benefits.
The Court balanced the governmental and private interests and held that an evidentiary hearing is
not required to terminate disability payments, and the administrative procedures set out in the
Social Security Act comport with due process. Id., 424 U.S. at 335, 349.
99. Id. at 335; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (dealing with the termination
of welfare benefits without any pre-termination hearing).
100. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 11. In Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 113 (1977), the Court held that
the interest in a driver's license is a substantial one, since the state cannot make a driver whole for
any personal inconvenience and economic hardship caused by a delay in redressing an erroneous
suspension.
101. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 12.
102. Id. at 18-19. The government's interest in highway safety was achieved by removing
drunken drivers from roads. Id. at 18.
103. Id. at 13. For the second prong of the Mathews test, the Court stated, "the Due Process
Clause has never been construed to require that the procedures used to guard against an erroneous
deprivation of a protectible property or 'liberty' interest be so comprehensive as to preclude any
possibility of error." Id.
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Justice Stewart, in his dissent, however, believed that Bell mandated a
pre-suspension hearing in Mackey,"14 since the pre-suspension hearing re-
quirement is negated only in an emergency. Furthermore, Justice Stewart
determined that the Massachusetts statute was not in response to an emer-
gency situation.105 Justice Stewart stated that "when adjudicative facts are
involved, when no valid governmental interest would demonstrably be dis-
served by delay, and when full retroactive relief cannot be provided, an
after-the-fact evidentiary hearing on a critical issue is not constitutionally
sufficient."106 Thus, the dissent concluded that the Bell-Fuentes test was
more appropriate than the Mackey-Mathews test.
3. Application to the Wisconsin Administrative Suspension Statute
The Supreme Court has not determined the constitutionality of an im-
plied consent statute that suspends licenses both for refusing to take a
chemical test and for failing the test.10 7 The Minnesota Supreme Court in
Heddan v. Dirkswager,0 8 however, addressed this question. The Minnesota
implied consent statute required a ninety day suspension for failing a chemi-
cal test with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.1% or more, and a six
month suspension for refusing to take the test. 09 The Minnesota statute is
similar to the Wisconsin statute, except the penalties for implied consent
refusal in Wisconsin are more severe." 0
The State Court in Heddan followed the Mackey v. Montrym analysis in
holding that the Minnesota statute was constitutional."' The Heddan
court stated that "drunken drivers pose a severe threat to the health and
104. Id. at 19-30 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens joined in
Justice Stewart's dissent.
105. Id. at 20. Justice Stewart stated that the suspension penalty is "imposed not as an emer-
gency measure to remove unsafe drivers from the roads, but as a sanction to induce drivers to
submit to breath-analysis tests." Id.
106. Id. at 21-22; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) where the Court held that a
post-deprivation hearing for welfare benefits without an evidentiary hearing before the termina-
tion did not comport with due process.
107. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 343.305 (West Supp. 1988). In State v. Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d 39,
403 N.W.2d 427 (1987), the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided an evidentiary issue under Wis-
consin's implied consent law but stated, "this case on its facts does not present the issue of...
license revocation... [for] defendant's refusal. We neither consider nor decide that issue." Id. at
48 n.2, 403 N.W.2d at 430 n.2.
108. 336 N.W.2d 54 (Minn. 1983).
109. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 169.123 (West Supp. 1983). The statute also provided a tempo-
rary seven day license upon revocation and established a post-suspension administrative review.
Id.
110. Wis. STAT. § 343.305(10) (1985-86). The penalty for a refusal in Wisconsin is one year
compared to the six month suspension in Minnesota.
111. Heddan, 336 N.W.2d at 59-65.
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safety of the citizens of Minnesota. The compelling interest in highway
safety justifies... making a revocation effective pending the outcome of the
prompt post-suspension hearing."
'1 12
To determine the constitutionality of § 343.305 of the Wisconsin Stat-
utes, the Wisconsin courts will inevitably apply the Mackey test in conform-
ity with the Heddan precedent."I However, the Mackey Court erroneously
utilized the balancing of interests test established in Mathews v. Eldridge.' 
1 4
The Supreme Court, in Bell v. Burson, stated that due process requires a
pre-suspension hearing except in emergency situations." 5 Based on Bell,
the Mackey Court should have applied the Fuentes test in analyzing the
constitutionality of the pre-hearing revocation under the Massachusetts im-
plied consent law.
The administrative suspension of Wisconsin Statutes § 343.305 is un-
constitutional under Bell since it is not in response to an emergency. Under
the first prong of the Fuentes test, license revocation without a prior hearing
is justifiable only if it is "directly necessary to secure an important govern-
mental or general public interest."" 6 Under the second prong, there must
be a "special need for very prompt action" which is accomplished by the
revocation.11 7 Although Wisconsin has an important interest in protecting
its citizens from drunken drivers, I" the administrative license suspension of
§ 343.305 goes beyond what is "directly necessary" to effectuate that
interest.
Under the Fuentes test, the Wisconsin driver's license suspension can
only be sustained as a "directly necessary" response to an emergency or as a
"special need for very prompt action"" 9 if it is assumed that these individu-
als would drive drunk during the suspension period. The possibility that
the driver may be removed from the road by arrest and held until the driver
112. Id. at 63.
113. In State v. Nordness, 128 Wis. 2d 15, 381 N.W.2d 300 (1986), the Wisconsin Supreme
Court utilized the Mackey-Mathews test in analyzing the defendant's challenge to the implied
consent law.
114. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
115. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
116. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972).
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., State v. Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d 39, 403 N.W.2d 427 (1987) (intent of legislature in
implied consent law was to facilitate gathering of evidence against drunken drivers to remove
them from state's highways); see also State v. Crandall, 133 Wis. 2d 251, 394 N.W.2d 905 (1986);
State v. Brooks, 113 Wis. 2d 347, 335 N.W.2d 354 (1983); City of Madison v. Bardwell, 83 Wis.
2d 891, 266 N.W.2d 618 (1978).
119. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91.
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is sober enough to drive, demonstrates that the suspension is not "necessary
and justified" by the need for prompt action. 20
The arrest itself serves to protect the government's interest in public
safety by immediately removing drunken drivers from the state's highways.
The Wisconsin statute goes far beyond its governmental interest. Thus, the
administrative suspension under the Wisconsin statute is not "directly nec-
essary" to maintain the safety of Wisconsin's roads, and the statute fails
under the Bell-Fuentes test.
In Mackey, Justice Stewart's criticism of the Massachusetts statute ap-
plies to the Wisconsin statute as well. Justice Stewart stated that "[tlhe
suspension penalty itself is concededly imposed not as an emergency mea-
sure to remove unsafe drivers from the roads, but as a sanction to induce
drivers to submit to breath-analysis tests." ' There is a justifiable govern-
mental interest in maintaining safe roads as well as an equally strong pur-
pose among the legislators and the public to punish drunken driving
offenders.1 2 Clearly, the punishment of drunken drivers was as important
an impetus behind the enactment of the Wisconsin statute as the protection
of the citizens of the state.1 23
The impaired driver penalties in § 343.305 of the Wisconsin Statutes
supports this argument based on the Holland rationale. In Holland v.
Parker,1 4 although the statute met the Fuentes criteria,125 the statute was
held unconstitutional since it did not respond to an emergency. The court's
holding in Holland was based on the fact that the statute applied only to
those drivers who refused the chemical test, and not to those who failed the
test. Similarly, the penalties in the Wisconsin statute for an implied consent
refusal are substantially more severe than the penalties for failing the
test. 12
6
120. Id.
121. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 20 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
122. See Milroy, supra note 51, at 1155. See, eg., State v. Crandall, 133 Wis. 2d 251, 394
N.W.2d 905 (1986) (implied consent law is designed to secure convictions and get drunken drivers
off the highways); State v. Brooks, 113 Wis. 2d 347, 335 N.W.2d 354 (1983) (purpose of implied
consent law is to obtain evidence to improve rate of convictions so those who drive drunk will be
punished).
123. See ACT 3 ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 2. "The Legislature wanted to make it clear that
... a driver is better off to comply with the law and take the [chemical] test than to refuse,...
even if taking the test results in a conviction." Id.
124. 354 F. Supp. 196 (D.S.D. 1973).
125. Id. at 202; see supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. Also, the driver who refuses to take the test
under the implied consent law must wait for thirty days to apply for an occupational license,
whereas the driver who agrees to take the test and is charged with an impaired driver offense is
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Clearly, "[t]he [Wisconsin] suspension penalty itself is concededly im-
posed not as an emergency measure... but as a sanction to induce drivers
to submit to breath-analysis tests."'I2 7 Further, "the critical fact that trig-
gers the suspension is noncooperation with the police, not drunken driv-
ing."' 28 Therefore, the punishment of the drunken driving offender is not a
legitimate governmental purpose to support a license revocation without
the due process guarantee of a prior hearing under the Bell-Fuentes emer-
gency rule or the Mackey-Mathews balancing test.
In addition, under the Mackey-Mathews test, the private interest of
"continued possession and use of [the] license pending the outcome of the
hearing" is balanced against the government's interest in maintaining safe
highways.' 2 9 This private interest is important, and the balance may sup-
port the pre-hearing revocation if sufficient remedies exist to protect the
private interest involved.1 30
Proponents asserting the constitutionality of the Wisconsin statute will
argue that the statute does in fact protect the private interest of the driver in
his or her license. For example, the proponents will assert that upon
seizure of the driver's license, the driver is issued a notice of suspension,13 1
which serves as a temporary driver's license for thirty days until the suspen-
sion takes effect.132 They will also contend that the driver may request a
post-suspension review (post-deprivation hearing) by the Department of
Transportation, 133 and if the driver is not satisfied with the results of the
review, he or she may request a court review. 1 Finally, they will argue
that the driver is eligible to apply for an occupational license.'35
These apparent "protections" are merely a facade for the unconstitu-
tionality of the statute under the fifth and fourteenth amendments, which
prevent a state from taking private property without due process. Beside
the fact that the driver is deprived of an important property interest without
immediately eligible to apply for an occupational license; see also Wis. STAT. § 343.305 (1985-86),
affected by 1987 Wis. Act 3.
127. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 20 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Milroy, supra note 51, at 1156.
131. Wis. STAT. § 343.305(8)(a) (1985-86), affected by 1987 Wis. Act 3 see. 29.
132. Id.
133. WIS. STAT. § 343.305(8)(b)1 (1985-86), affected by 1987 Wis. Act 3 sec. 29; see also
WISCONSIN DEP'T OF TRANSP., 1988 REVISIONS TO WISCONSIN'S OMVWI LAW: THE SYSTEM
OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION (1987) [hereinafter 1988 REVISIONS].
134. Wis. STAT. § 343.305(8)(c)4 (1985-86), affected by 1987 Wis. Act 3 sec. 29.
135. For failure of the chemical test under the implied consent law, see Wis. STAT.
§ 343.305(8)(d) (1985-86). For an implied consent refusal, see Wis. STAT. § 343.305(10)(b) (1985-
86).
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a pre-deprivation hearing, the post-deprivation hearing is unconstitutional.
The lack of a meaningful post-deprivation hearing136 is evident for a
number of reasons. First, the hearing is limited to the factual issues articu-
lated in the statute,137 based on documentary evidence consisting of the of-
ficer's report and the results of the chemical test.13 8 Second, the Wisconsin
statute does not require the arresting officer to appear at the hearing, even
though the defendant "may present evidence and may be represented by
counsel." 
139
The defendant's post-deprivation hearing forces the driver to protect an
important property interest without the right to confrontation or cross-ex-
amination of his accuser, the police officer. 1" Thus, a determination of one
of the issues under the statute, such as whether there was probable cause for
the arrest or whether the defendant was informed of the options regarding
the chemical tests, is resolved by the officer's report. 141 The absence of the
arresting officer at the hearing and the lack of the opportunity to cross-
examine the officer does not afford the driver a fair hearing. Therefore, the
post-deprivation hearing is not constitutional.
A third reason the post-deprivation hearing is not constitutionally ade-
quate is that a request for a court review by the defendant does not stay the
suspension." Finally, the defendant is entitled to submit a written argu-
ment limited to the issues in the statute only if the driver waives his or her
personal appearance at the hearing.1 43
The legislative intent behind the enactment of these provisions of the
statute was to assure an efficient, swift judicial process. 44 However, pro-
moting efficiency for the Wisconsin judiciary, rather than insuring against
an erroneous deprivation of property, is not a reason to violate due process.
136. Due Process requires the opportunity for a "meaningful" hearing. See, eg., Armstrong
v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950).
137. Wis. STAT. § 343.305(8)(b)2 (1985-86), affected by 1987 Wis. Act 3 sec. 29.
138. Wis. STAT. § 343.305(8)(b)l (1985-86).
139. Id.
140. The right to confrontation and cross-examination is necessary for an adequate and con-
stitutional hearing. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S.
474, 496 (1959). Justice Stewart, in his dissenting opinion, stated "a 'meaningful hearing' before
an impartial decisionmaker would require the presence of the officer who filed the report, the
attesting officer, and any witnesses the driver might wish to call." Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S.
1, 28 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
141. Wis. STAT. § 343.305(8)(b)2 (1985-86), affected by 1987 Wis. Act 3 see. 29; see supra
note 41 and accompanying text.
142. Wxs. STAT. § 343.305(8)(c)4 (1985-86).
143. Wis. ADMIN. CODE § 113.04(6) [Trans] 190-3 (Dec. 1987).
144. See 1988 REVISIONS, supra note 133.
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The driver should be able to provide the hearing examiner with some writ-
ten material before the hearing to inform the examiner of complex, disputed
issues. Consequently, it would be more efficient to present issues to the
hearing examiner before the hearing, thus affording the defendant a more
meaningful hearing.
Based on the importance of the affected private interests, Wisconsin's
post-deprivation hearing does not create a constitutional balance in favor of
the state. Furthermore, the specific provisions of § 343.305 of the Wisconsin
Statutes do not afford the defendant a meaningful hearing. A hearing that
permits the state to suspend a driver's license by documentary evidence,
without a fair opportunity to rebut the evidence, is tantamount to no hear-
ing at all. Thus, § 343.305 is an unconstitutional deprivation of private
property by the state.
IV. PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES TO THE CURRENT
WISCONSIN STATUTE
The new Wisconsin administrative suspension shifts the focus of the im-
paired driving statute away from removing drunken drivers from the roads
and directs it toward removing drivers who merely refuse to take a chemical
test. In short, we have devolved from a society where the law is governed by
reason, to one which is wholly governed by the law.
The elements of due process consist of affording the defendant a speedy
trial with an impartial jury and informing the defendant of the accusation.
Also, due process includes confronting adverse witnesses, presenting wit-
nesses in one's favor, and having the assistance of counsel.145 These ele-
ments are not to be diminished by the legislature for purposes of judicial
convenience or for easing the fiscal and administrative burdens of
government. 146
Notably, the absence of a pre-deprivation hearing and the insufficiency
of the post-deprivation hearing are inadequate substitutes for due process as
defined in the United States Constitution and the Wisconsin Constitu-
tion.147 The post-deprivation hearing is inadequate because the defendant is
denied the opportunity of confrontation and cross-examination of adverse
witnesses or other exculpatory evidence. Due process is a constitutionally
guaranteed right, which should not be tampered with by the legislatures or
the courts.
145. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
146. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
147. WIs. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
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The balancing test under Mackey v. Montrym and Mathews v. Eldridge,
by which the courts determine due process, is described as the government's
interest in removing drunken drivers from the road. The government's in-
terest should be in the prevention of drunken driving, rather than in remov-
ing from the road those who never should have gotten there in the first
place. An effective solution to the drinking-driving problem belongs at the
tavern door before the driver even enters his or her car.
In the criminal justice system, experts contend that prohibited conduct
is deterred by a fear of apprehension, swiftness and certainty of conviction,
and severity of the punishment.14 The concepts of law and deterrence are
inevitable considerations for proposing potential solutions to the problem of
drinking drivers. Perhaps more importantly than the deterrent effect of the
law, however, is the social pressure from family, employers, neighbors, and
members of peer groups.149
One solution to the problem of driving while under the influence of alco-
hol is to increase the fear of apprehension.' The implementation of this
solution may be accomplished by various channels including the state's edu-
cational system and media. Besides publicizing the changes in the enforce-
ment of the impaired driver statute, the newspapers could publish the
names of persons convicted of impaired driving. 5' Because of the public's
indignation toward the impaired-driving offender, the publication of offend-
ers' names in the newspapers will increase the fear of humiliation and dis-
grace to the public, serving as an effective deterrent.
A second solution is to reduce the punishment to moderate levels for
first offenders and identify the repeat offenders."5 2 The elimination of se-
vere penalties for first-time offenders, and the imposition of severe penalties
for repeat offenders will enhance the present system. This solution is effec-
tive because it would serve as a deterrent for convicted impaired drivers.
Also, out-of-state and federal convictions for impaired-driving offenses
should count as prior convictions for repeat offenders. In addition, all ar-
rests for impaired driving should be reported on the driver's record.15
3
148. Watts, The Drinking-Driving Problem: Assessing Some Proposed Solutions, 48 POPULAR
Gov'T 20, 23 (1983).
149. Id. at 23.
150. Id. at 25. Watts suggested that all drivers in moving violations or crashes be chemically
tested for alcohol. However, this also raises constitutional questions as to the use of routine alco-
hol screening. Id.
151. Id. at 26. The benefits of public education and information are long-term improvements.
Also, education can change attitudes and ingrained beliefs.
152. Id. at 27.
153. Id.
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A third solution is to use alcohol treatment programs for repeat offend-
ers as an additional mandatory requirement, rather than as an alternative to
the impaired driving penalty." 4 This solution may have long-term advan-
tages, especially for the chronic alcoholic. A program where a repeat of-
fender is able to render community service as "restitution" for impaired
driving in place of a mandatory jail sentence, would be rehabilitative for the
individual and more efficient for the state. For first-time offenders, the al-
ternative of community service is a better option to modify the inherent
harshness of the current law.1 55
Also, a driver arrested for a second impaired driving offense or a first
offense with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.2% or more, should be
screened as a potential alcoholic.156 The individual's referral to a local alco-
hol treatment center makes more sense than sending the individual to jail or
suspending the individual's driver's license. The administrative suspension
of the driver's license of an alcoholic has insufficient deterrent value, espe-
cially for the habitual offender, who will simply drive without a license.
Thus, for the state to properly deal with this problem, the Wisconsin Legis-
lature must address effective measures to deal with the alcoholic, repeat
offender.1 57
Further, there is a strong argument that managers of "drinking estab-
lishments" have a responsibility to prevent intoxicated patrons from driv-
ing. For example, the installation of chemical testing devices in local bars
would assist an individual in discovering his or her blood alcohol concen-
tration before driving on the state's roads. This solution would potentially
reduce the number of drunken drivers. Many metropolitan areas battle the
incidence of impaired driving by a cooperative effort between bars and taxi-
cab companies, where an intoxicated patron is provided a free ride home.15 8
Also, many bars will provide free soda to their customers who are "desig-
nated drivers."
Finally, it has been stated that "the single most effective thing.., to cut
down on deaths and injuries caused by the drinking driver [would be] to
pass an enforceable mandatory seat-belt law."' 59 As a result of Wisconsin's
154. Id.
155. Id. at 28.
156. Id. at 29.
157. Wis. STAT. § 343.305(8) (1985-86). The state's current system of a twelve to eighteen
month revocation for a second impaired driver offense and a twenty-four to thirty-six month
revocation for a third impaired driver offense will not be effective for the alcoholic repeat offender.
158. This program is utilized in Milwaukee, Wisconsin during Christmas and New Year's by
local bars and taxi services. The program is entitled "Operation Life Ride."
159. See supra note 148, at 35. Wisconsin implemented a mandatory seat-belt law effective
December 1, 1987. 1987 Wis. Act 132.
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mandatory seat-belt law, there will be a decrease in the number of deaths
and injuries due to the drunken driver. The safety of the public is an under-
lying purpose of § 343.305 of the Wisconsin Statutes. This purpose will be
accomplished by the mandatory seat-belt law, irrespective of the adminis-
trative license suspension statute. Thus, by going beyond mere deterrence
and focusing on the saving of lives, an indirect approach," there are addi-
tional solutions to the problems of drunken driving.
V. CONCLUSION
On a cost-benefit basis, the indirect approach to the drinking driver is
more effective than attempts to increase deterrence. 61 Although no single
solution will solve the problem of the drinking driver, a well-designed, im-
aginative program with a combination of the many solutions suggested
above would be well worth the state's efforts. Clearly, the state's implemen-
tation of the administrative license suspension statute alone will not effec-
tively deal with the problem of the drinking driver.
Beyond the inadequacy of Wisconsin's administrative license suspension
statute, the statute infringes on drivers' constitutional right of due process.
The unavailability of a pre-deprivation hearing, and the lack of a meaning-
ful post-deprivation hearing, deprive drivers of property without due pro-
cess. Thus, the current statute should be completely abrogated. The state
legislature should focus on the indirect solutions to the problem of the im-
paired driver rather than concentrate on enacting statutes with maximum
deterrent value.
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